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One dimension of law that all practising lawyers must face is 
handling relationships with clients. Traditionally this was not 
considered as something that could or should be researched. 
Recently, however, sociologists, linguists and other social scientists 
working within the area of socio-legal studies have paid a lot of 
attention to lawyers' interactions with their clients. Their studies 
highlight important aspects of the processes involved, particularly 
the relationship between power and representation. Yet they also 
suffer from deficiencies, which partly derive from their hidden 
theoretical and methodological assumptions. This paper aims to 
review and critique these studies, in the hope that the resulting 
insights may stimulate more reflection by the profession on this 
important aspect of advocacy. 
Lawyers as "One-Way" Translators 
Many of these studies focus on the way in which lawyers transform 
disputes, through their representation of clients. For instance, in 
their analysis of the way in which American divorce lawyers 
interact with their clients, Sarat and Felstiner (1986) emphasise the 
different agendas of both parties. Lawyers view the dispute in 
terms of its monetary consequences, while clients are often more 
interested in other matters, such as emotional vindication. Lawyers 
must therefore invest a lot of time in schooling their clients to 
accept their view of what the really important issues at stake are. In 
the process, they try to lower clients' expectations, re-defining both 
the dispute and even clients' selves so as to exclude those aspects 
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which cannot easily be inserted into the legal categories. Clients 
react to lawyers' efforts to narrow and re-define their cases by 
trying to obtain their lawyers' support for their own claims. They 
attempt to create emotional ties with their lawyers, who are wary of 
this. Clients persistently try to introduce the history and moral 
implications of their marriage relationships into their conferences 
with their lawyers. Lawyers in tum respond by partially 
legitimating their clients' stands, but do not in practice act on them. 
The effect of lawyers' attempts to separate the emotional aspect of 
the divorce from the material aspect, leaves clients feeling 
ambivalent and schizoid. They tend eventually to accept their 
lawyers' settlement of the dispute; but they feel angry and 
mistrustful of lawyers and the legal system. 
Sarat and Felstiner have further developed these themes in two 
other articles. In one, they look at the effect of these processes on 
clients' views of the legal system (Sarat & Felstiner 1989). They 
observe that while American divorce lawyers do act as 
intermediaries between the legal system and their clients, their 
brokerage activities are restricted to the sort of transformation of 
clients' lives and expectations which they discussed in the previous 
article. These lawyers do not, however, attempt to translate legal 
rules into concepts which their clients can handle. Consequently 
lawyers operate so as to translate clients' lives in order to be able to 
describe them in terms which mesh with legal categories; but they 
do not translate these legal categories so as to render them 
comprehensible to clients. This 'one-way translation'533 of lawyers 
enables them to prevent clients from gaining independent access to 
(and knowledge of) the public discourse of the law. Such 
independent access could undermine lawyers' claims to specialised 
expertise and their control over the case. Instead lawyers propagate 
cynicism about the system, suggesting that it does not work in 
terms of the legal rules. In this way, they imply that their own 
usefulness lies less in their knowledge of the law, which a well-
533 Lawyers' brokerage is 'one-way' according to this model, since it departs from a 
particular interpretation of the legal rules and attempts to translate clients' experiences to fit 
into this interpretation. Such a model does not envisage the rules themselves changing in 
response to clients' stories. 
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educated client might acquire, than m the insider contacts and 
connections which they possess. 
In the second article, (Sarat & Felstiner 1988), these issues are 
explored from the perspective of C. Wright Mills' analysis of 
'vocabularies of motive'. 534 They show how American divorce 
clients resort to vocabularies of motive in an effort to explain their 
own behaviour and that of the other spouse. While clients are very 
concerned to explain the motivations of their spouses' past 
activities, lawyers consider these to be legally irrelevant and do not 
really support their interpretations. However, when they attempt to 
impute the present actions of their spouses to negative traits in their 
characters, lawyers intervene in order to promote an alternative 
interpretation. They suggest instead that these actions are 
situationally determined by the stage which the divorce has 
reached. Through ensuring clients' agreement with their 
vocabulary of motive, lawyers obtain authorisation to take the legal 
steps which they perceive as necessary. Thus lawyers' 
transformation of clients' understandings of their disputes extends 
to persuading them to re-interpret the behaviour of their own 
spouses. 
The ultimate dominance of the lawyer's view of the dispute is an 
assumption which underlies all the articles reviewed so far. This 
'one-way translation' model of lawyers' brokerage ensures that 
they are always seen as the active agents who transform and re­
phrase disputes against the backdrop of the impotent resentment of 
their clients. In this model, the legal rules constitute an unalterable 
backdrop, conditioning lawyers' interactions with clients, while 
themselves remaining unaffected by these processes. This 
assumption also pervades other studies.535 Thus Blumberg (1975) 
observes that the American criminal defence lawyers he studied are 
embedded within networks of organised complicity linking them 
534 
· Mills argued that that distinct vocabularies of motive characterise different social strata
and are utilised in different social situations ( Mills 1940: 904). 
535 Ingleby (1988) confirms many of the observations of Sarat and Felstiner, showing how 
English divorce lawyers transform the way their clients view their cases so as to push them 
towards a mediated settlement and away from litigation. 
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up to prosecution lawyers, judges and administrative personnel 
within a closed court community. These social networks are a 
strategic response to the organisational problems of the criminal 
courts and lawyers find that forming part of them is a necessary 
condition for success. However, the other side of the coin is that 
through these networks lawyers come to be more responsive to the 
needs of the court community than to those of their clients and they 
therefore become "double agents" (Blumberg: 1975: 328) who seek 
to persuade their clients to plead guilty and have a vested interest in 
limiting the scope and duration of the case. In this context, clients 
experience legal representation as a 'confidence game' played at 
their expense. 
Bogoch and Danet (1984) also adopt a 'one way translation' model 
of brokerage in order to make sense of the interaction between an 
Israeli legal aid lawyer and her client. They analyse this encounter 
in great linguistic detail so as to show the strategic way in which 
this lawyer used language in order to assert control over the 
conversational agenda, suppressing her clients' views so as to 
ensure the domination of her interpretation of the dispute. 536 
Through these tactics this lawyer managed to acquire power at the 
expense of her client. They were so blatantly employed because 
they occurred in the context of a legal aid case. This lawyer was a 
member of a bureaucracy and did not stand to gain through being 
more responsive to her client. A private practitioner might be 
expected to show more understanding of clients' perceptions of the 
case. 
This conclusion indicates a significant problem with many of the 
studies which have been reviewed. It seems that most of the 
proponents of the 'one way translation' model of legal 
representation have not been sufficiently sensitive to the context in 
which their own studies have been carried out. In the research of 
Sarat and Felstiner, for example, it is initially stated that American 
536 
Thus they show how she interrupted her client frequently, especially when he was in the 
middle of an utterance; used directives, coercive requests and formal language; questioned 
the client's own knowledge; asked apparently random questions and laid claim to an 
intimate knowledge of her client's background. 
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divorce lawyers are the subject of research. However there is little 
attempt to relate the conclusions reached to the specific context in 
which research was carried out. Rather their conclusions, although 
based on the observation of a few cases, are often presented as 
iconically encapsulating general truths about lawyers and the law. 
Yet context clearly does explain many of the observations which 
are made, entering into the picture in various ways. To put it 
succinctly, there can be many different types of lawyers, a great 
diversity of cases and clients and broader cultural and social 
variations which might explain observed behaviour. 
A related criticism is the conspicuous absence of the lawyer's point 
of view from these studies. We hear a lot about the clients' 
emotions and very little about those of their lawyers. However 
attention to the practical constraints under which lawyers labour 
might expose important contextual factors affecting the quality of 
legal representation. Exploring lawyers' perspectives might also 
reveal short-comings in the 'one way translation' model of legal 
brokerage. 
Modifications to the Model 
These points are brought home if one considers other studies, such 
as the one carried out by Flood on corporate lawyers in Chicago. 
His approach is characterised by its greater sensitivity to the 
practical dilemmas lawyers must face. He argues that from the 
perspective of the lawyers he studied, the management of 
uncertainty is the most prominent feature of legaf work (Flood 
1991 ). Corporate lawyers feel uncertain due to a variety of factors, 
which range from their own subservient position within large law 
firms dominated by a few senior partners to the ambiguity of the 
legal rules themselves. 
An important cause of uncertainty is the behaviour of large 
business clients, who may withhold important information from 
their lawyer, leaving him in the dark as to the real issues which are 
at stake in business negotiations. This is consistent with the attitude 
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they often question their expertise and assert the primacy of 
knowledge of the marketplace over knowledge of the law. In this 
context, lawyers have to struggle to assert themselves and resort to 
various tactics to reduce uncertainty. They do not always succeed 
in imposing their definition of the situation and often have to 
accept that of their clients. 
Flood's research depicts lawyers in a very different way from the 
articles previously reviewed. Stressing lawyers' vulnerability to 
client pressure raises doubts about the universal validity of the 'one 
way translation' model of legal brokerage, since it suggests that 
lawyers' perceptions of the issues at stake will not necessarily 
prevail over those of clients. Griffiths's (1986) research on Dutch 
divorce lawyers also departs from this model. In fact, he goes even 
further than Flood in claiming that lawyers are not only subject to 
clients' pressures, but may also transform their explanation of the 
legal rules in order to cope with these pressures. His thesis is that 
lawyers are best viewed as 'double intermediaries', who not only 
transform clients' stories so as to engage with legal categories, but 
also transform the legal rules when they explain them to their 
clients. This process of transformation can occur in very subtle 
ways.s31 
However, while Griffiths accepts that lawyers may modify their 
explanation of the obtaining legal position in response to clients' 
pressure, neither he nor Flood go quite so far as to state that 
lawyers' interpretation of the legal rules may change in response to 
clients' pressures. Consequently although Griffiths describes 
lawyers as 'double intermediaries', he does not completely depart 
from the 'one way translation' model of their activities. In his 
scheme the legal rules themselves remain largely uninfluenced by 
lawyers' interactions with clients. At best, these interactions may 
condition the type of legal advice lawyers might give to clients. But 
they could have no impact on the way in which lawyers interpret 
537 For instance, lawyers can change the law simply by remaining silent about legal 
possibilities, or by presenting their opinion as the attitude of the courts. In this way lawyers 
actually exert influence by effacing themselves. 
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the legal rules when representing these clients during court 
litigation. 
Is Power Involved? 
Despite their differences, the studies reviewed reflect a broad 
consensus of opinion that lawyers are best described as mediators 
between their clients and the legal system. They derive the 
theoretical interest of studying lawyer/client interaction from the 
way the power struggle between lawyers and clients illuminates the 
wider issue of the social impact of legal systems. At this stage it is 
useful to consider the recent research of Travers, who adopts a 
polemical attitude towards these assumptions on the basis of his 
field research with a firm of criminal defence solicitors in the North 
of England (Travers 1991 ). His arguments can be summarised as 
follows: 
1) Conventional sociological studies of lawyer-client interaction
have overly theorised the subject. A preoccupation with grand
sociological themes exoticises the subject unnecessarily, leading
researchers to ignore the practical, improvisatory, character of the
actual work involved. He sought to remedy this in his own research
through adopting an ethno-methodological approach to observe the
daily work of a legal firm.
2) On the basis of his fieldwork, he concludes that accounts such as
that of Blumberg (1975) are wrong in presenting a cynical view of
lawyers as 'double agents' engaged in a 'confidence game'. He
gives a detailed analysis of a case he witnessed in which a lawyer
persuaded a client to plead guilty, overcoming her client's initial
resistance to this plea. This analysis shows how the lawyer's advice
was motivated by the desire to obtain the best possible deal for her
client in a context where the outcome of the case was never in any
doubt and where a guilty plea enabled the lawyer to minimise the
adverse effects her client would face (Travers 1992).
3) Travers also attacks the claimed significance of power for
understanding lawyer/client interaction (Travers 1994). His
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argument is that lawyers are in a position of interactional 
dominance vis-a-vis their clients, but that there is nothing 
surprising or sinister about this, since it is a natural result of the 
fact that they are legal experts, possessing more knowledge of the 
law then their clients do. An analytical focus on power obscures the 
practical features of legal work and adds nothing to our 
understanding of it. Moreover, clients do not normally see 
themselves as involved in a power struggle with their lawyers. 
Finally, the interactional dominance of lawyers is variable, 
diminishing in proportion to clients' intelligence and experience of 
the system. 
These arguments directly attack the consensus of opm1on 
underlying the other studies reviewed. If correct, the theoretical 
significance of studying legal representation is considerably 
reduced. A critique of them will therefore provide the basis on 
which to develop our understanding of legal representation. 
My assessment of Travers's ideas will depart from a re-evaluation 
of his use of ethnomethodology. It seems that he sees 
ethnomethodology as something more than a technique for social 
investigation focusing on the micro-processes through which 
everyday reality is constructed. He argues that while conventional 
sociological accounts over-theorise the subject, ethnomethodology 
allows direct observation of the practical basis of everyday 
decisions. Thus it can be used to rebut 'ironical' accounts of 
lawyer/client interaction such as Blumberg's (op.cit.). This 
approach is more sympathetic to lawyers' perspectives; exposing 
the practical constraints they face and the hidden work performed 
for clients. Yet the argument is fundamentally flawed in suggesting 
that it is possible to observe any human activity without recourse to 
some implicit theory regarding the purpose of that activity. 
The ethnographic truism that perception is always mediated by 
culture is confirmed by Travers's own resort to an explanatory 
theory for the actions of one lawyer he observed. He claims that 
she: "had to make the best she could out of a situation where the 
ultimate outcome for the defendant was at no time in doubt" 
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(Travers 1992: 35). Similarly his caution against undue 
exoticisation of lawyer/client interaction must be seen against the 
background of his own research, where words like 'mundane' and 
'boring' are bandied around until they acquire an exotic halo.
538 
The problems with this approach become clearer when looking at 
the practical examples given. Travers cites Sarat and Felstiner's 
work as an example of an overly theoretical approach. Yet their 
conclusion that American divorce lawyers try to persuade their 
clients to abandon emotive discourse surely identifies a practical 
concern which forms part of their everyday work. Even more 
telling is the example of lawyer/client interaction which he 
provides when criticising Blumberg's description of such 
encounters as 'confidence-games'. He argues that this case 
confirms the superiority of an ethnomethodological approach, since 
it shows that lawyers may persuade their clients to plead guilty 
without betraying professional ideals of defending them to the hilt. 
However a close analysis can easily account for the differences 
between his conclusions and Blumberg's. Indeed, Travers's 
rebuttal of Blumberg depends on exposing the hidden work lawyers 
do for their clients, thus confirming Blumberg's argument that 
legal work leaves room for suspicion in clients' minds that 
confidence games are being played at their expense. Moreover 
Travers admits that he studied a firm of solicitors whose 
distinguishing characteristic is unusual sympathy towards their 
clients' point of view, evoking the possibility that Blumberg's 
insights might apply to the way most criminal defence lawyers 
handle their clients. 
Ultimately the deficiencies of Travers's analysis of legal 
representation derive from his conception of power. Here his 
argument revolves around the related claims that (a) focusing on 
power adds nothing to our knowledge of legal representation and 
538 Indeed some degree of exoticisation seems indispensable if socio-legal studies are to 
fulfil their critical potential. This is because, as Bourdieu (1977) observes, the ultimate 
disguise of processes of domination are precisely notions of what is 'ordinary' and 'natural'. 
In this context the only way to expose hegemonic power structures may be through 
questioning what is 'ordinary' and 'taken for granted'. 
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(b) there is nothing sinister about lawyers' power, which is a
natural outcome of their knowledge of the law. This last claim can
usefully be approached from the standpoint of Sherr' s research
(1986), which set out to assess the quality of lawyers'
communicative skills by testing the ability of a set of graduate
lawyers to interview clients during their first meeting. Sherr makes
practically no reference to power in his analysis, preferring to refer
to an idealised model of how lawyer/client interaction should
proceed to ensure optimal communication between the two sides.
As a result, he can only interpret many of his findings as a failure
in communication on the part of lawyers, while they would be
perfectly intelligible as attemrts to acquire power vis-a-vis clients
by withholding information. 53 
Once one accepts that power is an important feature of legal 
representation, this raises the second issue of the way in which to 
conceive power. Hannerz (1992) also derives lawyers' power from 
their legal knowledge. Unlike Travers, who sees this as natural and 
reassuring, Hannerz suggests that the routine, systematic and 
unintentional qualities of professional power are the factors which 
ensure domination. On the one hand Travers argues that there can 
be nothing sinister about a power which is so routinely exercised 
that most clients do not consider themselves to be involved in a 
power struggle with their lawyers. On the other, Hannerz points to 
the contrast between the insecurity of clients, whose contact with 
lawyers is generally a 'one-off experience, and the routine 
character of legal work for lawyers. The latter unintentionally 
dominate their clients while maintaining a view of their work as 
simply part of the division oflabour (Hannerz 1992: 121). 
Hannerz's conception of power corresponds to that underlying 
much contemporary social research. Lukes, for instance, describes 
power as the ability to shape the mental landscape of the dominated 
by making certain possibilities unthinkable and thereby imposing 
misunderstanding of the objective situation (Lukes 1993 ). Bourdieu 
539 Sherr observes regretfully that the lawyers he studied do not inform their clients of the 
work they intend to do for them, that they tend to exercise excessive control over the 
conversational agenda, often cross-examine clients and use difficult language. 
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also portrays symbolic power as an invisible power which can be 
exercised: "only with the complicity of those who do not want to 
know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves 
exercise it" (Bourdieu 1992: 164). As opposed to a hierarchical 
view which identifies power with legitimate authority, this 
conception emphasises the fact that power is exerted over human 
beings (Aron 1964) and is therefore socially negotiated (Simmel 
1978). For this reason, power is primarily seen not as an object to 
be possessed; but rather as something which must be 
communicated through cultural media like discourse (Foucault 
1990), or even silence.540 This stress on the communicative nature 
of power intersects with the work of linguists and other cultural 
analysts who have also emphasised the power-laden nature of 
communicative relations (Bakhtin 1994 ). 541 The resulting 
perception of power foregrounds rhetoric and persuasion more than 
imperative commands and authority. 
In this context, it is interesting to note that Travers' s own case­
studies are replete with instances of discursive struggle, in which 
lawyers try to persuade their clients to follow their advice against 
the resistance of the latter. However, rather than describing these as 
attempts to exert power, Travers prefers to write about the: 
"interactional pressure" ( 1994: 24) exerted by lawyers, who are in a 
position of: "interactional dominance" (ibid: 26). A close reading 
of his writings reveals two further reasons for this careful 
avoidance of the descriptive terminology of power. The first relates 
to the way in which a power analysis tends to shift from the study 
of lawyer-client interviews to: "that of law as a macro-institution" 
(ibid: 28). He argues that moving from one to the other is incorrect, 
not least because it gives a distorted characterisation of lawyers and 
legal work. 
The problem with such reasoning has been identified by Bourdieu, 
who observes that one cannot understand the form of small-scale 
540 As in Lukes's (1993) conception. 
541 Here I have in mind Bakhtin's focus on the way speakers compromise between what they 
would like to convey through their words and what is realistically possible given the 
linguistic effects of existing power relations. 
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linguistic exchanges (such as those between lawyers and clients), if 
one does not take into account larger structural discrepancies in 
power: 
That is what is ignored by the interactionist perspective, which 
treats interaction as a closed world, forgetting that what happens 
between two persons -between an employer and an employee or, in 
a colonial situation, between a French speaker and an Arabic 
speaker-- derives its particular form from the objective relation 
between the corresponding languages or usages, that is, between 
the groups who speak those languages (Bourdieu 1992: 67). 
This integrative capacity of power, which connects minor events to 
larger social forces constitutes the most important objection to 
Travers' s attempt to detach research on the everyday business of 
legal representation from the study of larger social power relations. 
By contrast, a more fruitful way of exploring legal representation is 
provided by Johnson (1972). In his study on the sociology of the 
professions, he argues that the increasing specialisation brought 
about by the division of labour also increases the social distance 
between lawyers and clients and gives rise to uncertainty as to how 
legal needs are to be determined and catered for. This uncertainty 
may be resolved in favour of the lawyer or his client depending on 
larger power relationships between lawyers and different categories 
of clients. 
Comparing Johnson's approach to Travers's brings out the second 
reason for the latter's avoidance of power. In fact, while Johnson 
sees uncertainty as a central feature of lawyer/client interviews, 
Travers emphasises that the outcome of these interviews is never in 
any doubt. This is because the lawyer's perception of the issues at 
stake and the necessary legal response must necessarily prevail 
over that of the client, given the lawyer's greater knowledge of the 
legal rules. Like the previously reviewed studies, Travers therefore 
promotes a 'one-way translation' model of legal representation; in 
which the lawyer translates his client's story to fit into unchanging 
legal descriptive categories. Johnson's analysis compels us to 
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explore the other possibility: what if uncertainty is also resolved in 
favour of the client; so that it is the lawyer's interpretation of the 
legal rules which alters to accommodate the client's perception of 
the issues involved and the necessary legal response? In this 'two­
way' model of legal brokerage, neither the distribution of power 
between lawyers and clients nor the interpretation of the legal rules 
are seen as fixed a priori by the legal system. Rather, both are 
socially negotiated between particular lawyers and clients in a 
manner which reflects broader power relationships. 
Lawyers as "Two-Way" Translators 
To comprehend the practical processes to which the 'two-way' 
model of legal representation refers, it is useful to refer to the 
analytical framework constructed by Mather and Y ngvesson 
(1981 ). They identify two ways in which the linguistic description 
of a dispute can be transformed after it has been brought before a 
third party to be resolved. 
The first, which they call 'narrowing', is fundamentally a 
conservative act, occurring when the dispute is re-phrased in terms 
of established linguistic categories. This process of narrowing is 
equivalent to the sort of changes which lawyers must bring about to 
clients' perceptions of their cases in terms of the 'one-way 
translation' model. 
The second type of dispute transformation is 'expansion'. This is a 
radical phenomenon, occurring when a dispute is re-phrased in 
terms of categories which were not previously accepted by the third 
parties hearing the dispute. 
It corresponds to the reinterpretation of legal rules which can occur 
when, in response to client pressure, lawyers are led to regard laws 
in terms of clients' stories, rather than translating clients' stories in 
legal terms. Table one illustrates these divergent models of legal 
representation: 
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Table one 
First Scenario: 'One-way Translation' 
(The model of Legal Rules -+ Lawyer -+ Client's Story 
Sarat & Felstiner) (Unchanged) (Dominates) (Translated) 
Second Scenario: Modified 'One-way Translation' 
(The model of Legal Rules -+ Lawyer ++ Client's Story 
Griffiths & Flood) (Unchanged) (Tries to control) (Translated) 
Third Scenario: Two-way' Model 
(Johnson's model) Legal Rules ++ Lawyer++ Client's Story 
(Reinterpreted) (Tries to control) (Translated) 
In Table One, the First Scenario presents the 'one-way translation' 
model. Here the legal rules are seen to determine lawyers' relations 
with their clients. Lawyers' power is based on their knowledge of 
the rules. They intervene to transform, by a 'narrowing' translation, 
clients' perceptions of the case. The interpretation of the legal rules 
is uninfluenced by lawyer/client interactions. 
The Second Scenario maintains, but modifies, this model. Here it is 
accepted that clients may also put pressure on their lawyers, 
leading to changes in their explanation of the legal position. 
However lawyers' interpretation of the legal rules remains 
unaffected by this process. By contrast, the Third Scenario accepts 
that both 'narrowing' and 'expansion' may occur. Lawyers may 
also change their interpretation of the legal rules so as to 
accommodate clients' stories. This 'two-way' model envisages that 
clients may also exercise a cultural power of persuasion over their 
lawyers. 
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Additional confirmation of the utility of the ''two-way" translation 
model is provided by a recent article by Miller ( 1994 ), which 
applies narrative analysis to the study of legal representation. Here 
she follows in the footsteps of Cunningham (1989); who views 
legal representation as an act of translation by which lawyers try to 
translate their clients' stories into the conceptual categories of the 
laws and vice versa. However Miller attempts to move beyond 
these studies because the metaphor of translation suggests that 
lawyers mediate between two completely different languages 
which do not intersect and limit themselves to explaining words in 
one language in terms of the other. Since neither of the languages is 
altered by the translation, this metaphor does not allow for the 
possibility that the legal rules themselves might be reinterpreted in 
response to clients' stories. Also, it naively assumes that clients are 
always powerless, that their stories must always diverge from those 
of lawyers and that clients want lawyers to tell their versions. Most 
damagingly, the translation metaphor obscures the way: "legal 
story-telling, at its best, is more than either lawyer or client story­
telling" (Miller 1994: 527). 
Miller's own description of legal representation rests on the insight 
that stories bridge the gap between clients' perceptions and the 
legal rules. Because stories create a discursive continuum between 
these two poles, they can be a vehicle for the expression of clients' 
power; enabling them to appropriate the meaning of the legal rules 
in their own interests.
542 Clients' narratives have the potential of 
enriching legal doctrine by providing a different perspective on the 
legal categories. This in tum affects the role of lawyers, who can 
no longer assume that their interpretative outlooks will necessarily 
prevail over those of their clients and must now view legal 
representation as a process for which clients are co-responsible. By 
explicitly linking the rule/story dialectic to what I have called a 
'two way' conception of legal representation, Miller highlights the 
542 She illustrates this by referring to a case she defended, showing how attention to the 
clients' story meant giving the client more power to participate in the decisions that were 
taken in regard to his case and also led her to view both the legal rules and the factual 
evidence in a new light. 
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uses of narrative analysis to explore the way lawyers and clients 
negotiate power in specific cases of legal representation. 
Conclusion 
It is clear in this context that the greater analytical usefulness543 of 
the 'two-way' model lies in the way it avoids prejudging the 
outcome of lawyer-client interaction. Since power is not considered 
as the exclusive possession of those who know the legal rules, our 
attention is directed to the cultural power which may be exerted by 
clients and through language. Here the analytical tradition which 
detaches the study of lawyer/client interaction from the wider 
process of legal representation, can be seen to perpetuate a view of 
the legal rules as an inflexible backdrop determining the outcome 
of such interaction. Only by making the interpretation of the legal 
rules part of the analysis of lawyer/client interaction can we avoid 
the limitations of the 'one-way translation' model. It is therefore 
necessary to explore the interaction between the interpretation of 
legal rules and that of clients' stories throughout the entire process 
of legal representation. Research in this field should be holistic: 
relating lawyer/client interviews to the drafting of judicial acts, 
court litigation and adjudication. 
To conclude, it appears from this analysis that lawyer/client 
interaction is an important indicator of the way in which law is 
made socially present and applicable in a particular setting. 
Research in this field should aim to contextualise particular 
observations within a more holistic understanding of the way legal 
processes and institutions operate in a specific society. One must 
543 As confinned by its ability to explain aspects of Travers's own analysis which he left in 
the dark. In fact, the case-study which he used in order to attack Blumberg's description of 
law as a confidence game was clearly a case of dispute expansion. Travers notes that the 
client in this case resisted her lawyer's attempts to persuade her to plead guilty and that the 
lawyer did not advise her to plead guilty to the facts as presented by the prosecution, but to a 
similar set of facts which only constituted a technical offence. He also observes that this 
offence was one which the Magistrate's Court had not encountered before and there was 
some initial confusion as to whether to allow it. Here the client's resistance to the insertion 
of her case into narrow legal categories can be seen to have led to a change in the legal 
categories, towards a closer match with the client's understanding of her case. 
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keep in mind that both lawyers and clients are themselves 
theorising agents. So as to avoid reproducing traditional 
professional assumptions about the lawyer/client relationship, one 
should avoid using a legalistic terminology and conceptual 
frameworks to underpin research. In particular, one should avoid 
assuming that lawyers are/should be in charge of the relationship 
because they (should) know the law. 
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